

Message Text

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USIE-00 INRE-00 OMB-01 AID-05 IGA-02 EB-07 COME-00

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FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6343

SECDEF WASHDC//ASD/DSAA (ISA)//

USEUCOM J4/J7//

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 KINSHASA 1001

NOFORN

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MASS, CG

SUBJECT: CHIEF OF MISSION ASSESSMENT - U.S. MILITARY SECURITY
ASSISTANCE FY-77

REF: A. STATE 017370; B. KINSHASA 0834

1. ZAIRE WILL CONTINUE TO NEED SIGNIFICANT AMOUNTS OF FMSCR FOR TWO REASONS: (1) ZAIRE CANNOT AFFORD TO BUY MILITARY MATERIEL EXCEPT THROUGH THE USE OF CREDIT; (2) ZAIRE'S NEED FOR A CREDIBLE MILITARY DETERRENT HAS BECOME URGENT WITH THE SOVIET INTRODUCTION OF SOPHISTICATED MILITARY HARDWARE INTO THE COUNTRIES BORDERING ZAIRE. FROM ZAIRE'S POINT OF VIEW, THIS MOVE BY THE USSR HAS UPSET THE REGIONAL BALANCE OF POWER IN FAVOR OF SOVIET CLIENT STATES TO A DANGEROUS DEGREE. THE RATE OF PROGRESS FOR ZAIRE'S MILITARY MODERNIZATION WILL BE IN DIRECT PROPORTION TO THE FMSCR LEVEL GRANTED BY THE U.S. SIGNIFICANT ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE CREDIT FROM OTHER COUNTRIES DOES NOT APPEAR LIKELY, AND
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OTHER FORMS OF COMMERICAL FINANCING FOR MILITARY PURCHASES

SEEM EQUALLY UNLIKELY IN VIEW OF CURRENT ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. THE ABRUPT PULLOUT OF THE NORTH KOREANS, BECAUSE OF THEIR CONFLICT OF INTEREST ON THE ANGOLAN QUESTION. LEFT ZAIRE WITH A PARTIALLY TRAINED, PARTIALLY EQUIPPED DIVISION. AT THE MOMENT IT IS PRIMARILY A PAPER DIVISION IN TERMS OF COMBAT READINESS AS PROVISIONS FOR SUSTAINING LOGISTICAL SUPPORT AND FOLLOW-ON TRAINING WERE NEVER MADE. THE U.S. EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING PROPOSED IN REF B THUS RESPONDS TO A LEGITIMATE DEFENSE REQUIREMENT.

2. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PRESENT AND FUTURE U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR ZAIRE WAS GREATLY ENHANCED BY THE ROCKWELL REPORT, A STUDY CONDUCTED EARLY LAST YEAR AT PRESIDENT MOBUTU'S REQUEST BY A U.S. MILITARY TEAM OF EXPERTS

AND HEADED BY MAJOR GENERAL ROCKWELL. THIS REPORT PROVIDES FOR A RATIONAL BUILDUP OF A MODEST, NON-PROVOCATIVE AND DEFENSIVE MILITARY STRUCTURE OVER AN EIGHT-YEAR TIME SPAN. ALTHOUGH THE ROCKWELL REPORT REQUIRES MODIFICATIONS AS A RESULT OF THE INTRODUCTION OF SOVIET WEAPONS INTO THE AREA, IT IS LEAST INJECTS SOME DEGREE OF RATIONALITY INTO THE PLANNING PROCESS, AND WILL SERVE AS A MODEL FOR ESTABLISHING FORCE OBJECTIVES OVER TIME WITHIN DOLLAR CONSTRAINTS. THE CHIEF OF THE U.S. MILITARY MISSION TO ZAIRE (ZAMISH) IS CURRENTLY PRESSING THE ZAIRIAN MILITARY FOR A JOINT STUDY OF THE ROCKWELL RECOMMENDATIONS TO SHAKE OUT DIFFERENCES OF OPINION AND TO ARRIVE AT A COORDINATED PLAN FOR MODERNIZATION AND ACQUISITION OF MATERIEL. PROGRESS IN THIS EFFORT WOULD DO MUCH TO MAXIMIZE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FY-77 PROGRAM AS WELL AS FMSCR OBJECTIVES IN SUCCEEDING YEARS.

3. HISTORICALLY, ZAIRE (LIKE MANY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES) EMBARKED ON A PIECEMEAL, YEAR-TO-YEAR BUYING PROGRAM, TAKING WHATEVER PRODUCTS--MILITARY OR COMMERCIAL--THAT WERE WITHIN BUYING RANGE. THE RESULTANT Hodgepodge of incompatible equipment and ensuing logistical nightmares underscored the need for planned buying and standardization of equipment. ZAIRIAN MILITARY PLANNERS ARE WELL

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AWARE OF THESE PROBLEMS, AND MORE AND MORE ARE TURNING TO ZAMISH FOR ADVICE ON HOW TO MAXIMIZE THEIR LIMITED DEFENSE BUDGET. ALTHOUGH DIFFERENCES OF OPINION ON TYPES AND QUANTITIES OF HARDWARE ARE CERTAIN TO ARISE, THE FACT THAT THE U.S. HAS GREATLY INCREASED FMSCR TO ZAIRE MAKES THE ADVICE WE OFFER MORE PALATABLE TO THE ZAIROIS AND THEREBY INCREASES OUR INFLUENCE WITH REGARD TO THE RESULTANT MILITARY STRUCTURE.

4. BOTH PROCUREMENT OPTIONS PROPOSED IN REF B ARE BUILDING BLOCKS IN THE OVERALL LONG-RANGE MILITARY MODERNIZATION PROGRAM FOR ZAIRE, AND THE RATIONALE FOR THE PROPOSED HARDWARE IS THOROUGHLY SPELLED OUT IN THE ROCKWELL REPORT. EACH OPTION OFFERS A REASONABLY EFFECTIVE DEFENSE AGAINST A SPECIFIC THREAT. ALL ITEMS RECOMMENDED IN BOTH OPTIONS CAN BE RELATED TO LONG-TERM FORCE OBJECTIVES FOR ZAIRE AND ALSO TO THE THREAT DEVELOPING ALONG ZAIRE'S BORDERS. THE INTER-RELATIONSHIP AND COSTS OF HARDWARE ACQUISITION AND ASSOCIATED TRAINING REQUIREMENTS ARE PROGRAMMED INTO PROCUREMENT PROJECTIONS, AND THE SIGNIFICANT INCREASE FORECAST FOR GRANT AID TRAINING OFFERS A REALISTIC AND WORKABLE APPROACH TO PROGRAMMED MILITARY MODERNIZATION FOR ZAIRE.

5. THE REMAINDER OF THIS MESSAGE IS IN RESPONSE TO THE QUESTIONS IN PARA 7 OF REF A CONCERNING ECONOMIC ASPECTS.

6. PATTERNS OF ECONOMIC AID TO ZAIRE: ZAIRE RELIES HEAVILY ON FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO HELP DEVELOP ITS CONSIDERABLE ECONOMIC POTENTIAL AND PROVIDE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND SOCIAL SERVICES. PUBLIC GRANTS FROM OTHER GOVERNMENTS OR MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS TOTALED \$113 MILLION IN 1974. APPROXIMATELY TWO-THIRDS OF PUBLIC GRANT ASSISTANCE WENT FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND ABOUT ONE-THIRD WAS FOR SPECIFIC ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROJECTS. BELGIUM, WHICH CONTRIBUTED \$57 MILLION, WAS BY FAR THE LARGEST SOURCE OF BILATERAL GRANTS IN 1974. FRANCE, WHICH CONTRIBUTED \$18 MILLION, WAS THE SECOND LARGEST SOURCE OF BILATERAL GRANTS. THE EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT FUND, WHICH CONTRIBUTED \$18 MILLION, WAS THE LARGEST MULTILATERAL SOURCE OF GRANTS TO ZAIRE. THE US GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTED

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\$2.7 MILLION IN GRANT ASSISTANCE TO ZAIRE IN 1974, MAINLY IN THE FORM OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN AGRICULTURE, HEALTH AND FAMILY PLANNING. (RECENTLY MOST U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE HAS BEEN IN THE FORM OF LOANS). PUBLIC LOANS TO ZAIRE TOTALED \$15 MILLION IN 1974, MOST OF WHICH CAME FROM BILATERAL SOURCES. PRIVATE GIFTS TO ZAIRE AMOUNTED TO \$10 MILLION IN 1974. MUCH OF THIS COMES IN THE FORM OF THE SERVICES OF MISSIONARIES WHO ARE ACTIVE IN PROVIDING HEALTH AND EDUCATIONAL SERVICES, PARTICULARLY IN RURAL ZAIRE. PRIVATE CAPITAL INFLOWS IN THE FORM OF CREDITS OR DIRECT PRIVATE INVESTMENT, OFTEN INSURED OR GUARANTEED BY GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, AMOUNTED TO \$236 MILLION IN 1974.

7. RECENT ECONOMIC AID TO ZAIRE: BECAUSE OF A SHARP

FALL IN THE PRICE OF ITS PRINCIPAL EXPORT, COPPER, ZAIRE
HAS SUFFERED FROM A SERIOUS BALANCE OF PAYMENTS CRUNCH SINCE
1975. THIS INTENSIFIED ITS NEED FOR, AND ITS RELIANCE
ON, FOREIGN ASSISTANCE. IN 1975 THE GOZ DREW DOWN
\$88 MILLION FROM THE IMF ON ITS GOLD TANCHE AND FROM THE
OIL FACILITY,. DISCUSSIONS WITH IMF REPRESENTATIVE ARE

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O 040859Z FEB 76

FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6344

SECDEF WASHDC//ASD/DSAA (ISA)//

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 KINSHASA 1001

PRESENTLY UNDERWAY IN KINSHASA AND IT IS EXPECTED THAT
AGREEMENTS WILL SOON BE SIGNED THAT WILL RESULT IN
SDR 118 MILLION (\$138 MILLION) IMMEDIATE SUPPORT FOR ZAIRE
WITH AN ESTIMATED \$70 MILLION AVAILABLE LATER. A NUMBER OF
TRADITIONAL WESTERN DONORS HAVE INDICATED THEIR WILLINGNESS
TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL SUPPORT SHOULD THE GOZ SIGN AN
AGREEMENT WITH THE IMF. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT THE AMOUNT
OF THIS ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE COULD REACH ABOUT \$150 MILLION.
ARAB CREDITS TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ZAIRE HAVE TOTALED AT
LEAST \$35 MILLION IN 1975. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE IN THE
FORM OF CHINESE AGRICULTURAL EXPERTS, MEDICAL TEAMS AND
OTHER ASSISTANCE HAS ALSO BEEN RECEIVED IN 1975, BUT
NO ESTIMATES OF THE DOLLAR VALUE OF THIS SUPPORT ARE AVAIL-
ABLE. TOTAL OBLIGATIONS UNDER ORDINARY USG ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE IN ZAIRE IN FY76 ARE EXPECTED TO
REACH \$13 MILLION. THIS INCLUDES \$2.4 MILLION IN OPERATING

EXPENSES AND NEW PROJECT OBLIGATIONS OF \$10.8 MILLION
IN ADDITION, DISBURSEMENTS IN FY76 ON PRIOR YEAR OBLIGATIONS
AGAINST ON-GOING PROGRAMS WILL TOTAL ABOUT \$5 MILLION.
THE USG HAS ALSO PROPOSED AN EXTRAORDINARY BALANCE OF
PAYMENTS RELIEF ASSISTANCE PACKAGE WHICH WOULD INCLUDE
CREDITS FROM THE COMMODITY CREDIT CORP., EXIMBANK, THE
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COMMODITY IMPORT PROGRAM AND PL-480. THE TOTAL AMOUNT
OF CREDIT ENVISIONED UNDER THE PROPOSED PACKAGE WOULD
TOTAL ABOUT \$60 MILLION. THE CCC CREDITS FOR \$15 MILLION
HAVE ALREADY BEEN APPROVED AND THE PL-480 PROGRAM FOR
\$8. MILLION IS EXPECTED TO BE NEGOTIATED IN THE VERY NEAR
FUTURE BETWEEN THE USG AND THE GOZ.

8. IMPACT OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE: IN THE EARLY POST-
INDEPENDENCE PERIOD, THE BASIC OBJECTIVE AND EFFECT OF
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE WAS TO MAINTAIN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
AND ESSENTIAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SERVICES. A RELATED
OBJECTIVE, WHICH WAS ACHIEVED MORE SLOWLY AND WITH MORE
DIFFICULTY, WAS TO ESTABLISH DOMESTIC ORDER WITH A VIEW
TOWARDS CREATING A SITUATION WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE
CONGOLESE TO RESOLVE THEIR POLITICAL DIFFERENCES. U.S.
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE WAS CRUCIAL. THE U.S. WAS THE
LARGEST DONOR OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, DISBURSING
\$344.9 MILLION BETWEEN 1960 AND 1968. UNTIL 1966 MOST OF
THIS ASSISTANCE WAS IN THE FORM OF GRANTS. MOST AMERICAN
ASSISTANCE FOR THE PURCHASE OF FOOD, MACHINERY
PHARMACEUTICALS, ETC. THE UNITED NATIONS AND BELGIUM
WERE ALSO MAJOR DONORS DURING THIS PERIOD, CONTRIBUTING
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PERSONNEL FOR UNIVERSITY AND
SECONDARY TEACHING, AGRICULTURE, HEALTH, COMMUNICATIONS,
TRANSPORTATION, FINANCE, AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION. THE
FRENCH ALSO CARRIED OUT A SUBSTANTIAL PROGRAM OF
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE DURING THIS PERIOD. THE INTER-
NATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF) PROVIDED TECHNICAL ASSIS-
TANCE IN DEVELOPING THE 1967 CURRENTY REFORM THAT PUT
THE COUNTRY'S FINANCIAL AND MONETARY SYSTEM ON A SOUND
BASIS.

9. IN SUM, FOREIGN ASSISTANCE HELPED THE CONGOLESE
GOVERNMENT DEAL WITH THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES
OF THE POLITICAL TURBEULENCE OF THE POST-INDEPENDENCE
PERIOD. THE ASSISTANCE WAS PARTICULARLY HELPFUL IN OVER-
COMING THE SHORTAGE OF TRAINED CONGOLESE AND THE BALANCE
OF APYMENTS PROBLEMS CAUSED BY PRODUCTION DIPS AND
PRIVATE CAPITAL OUTFLOWS. IN THE PERIOD BETWEEN 1968 AND
1974 THE EFFECT OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE WAS TO CONTRIBUTE
TO ZAIRE'S REMARKABLE ECONOMIC GROWTH. DURING THIS
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PERIOD THE ZAIRIAN ECONOMY GREW AT AN AVERAGE REAL ANNUAL RATE OF NEARLY SEVEN PERCENT. THROUGHOUT THE PERIOD, THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF AMERICAN ASSISTANCE AND UN ASSISTANCE DECREASED WHILE THE RELATIVE ROLE OF WESTERN EUROPE INCREASED, BOTH THROUGH BILATERAL PROGRAMS AND THROUGH THE EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT FUND. BOTH BELGIUM AND FRANCE CONTINUED LARGED GRANT ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS. DURING THIS PERIOD FOREIGN DONORS NOT ONLY PROVIDED CONTINUED TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE BUT ALSO SUPPLEMENTED THE INADEQUATE LEVEL OF DOMESTIC SAVINGS, ALLOWING A HIGHER LEVEL OF INVESTMENT AND OF ECONOMIC GROWTH. WHILE THE TOTAL INFLOWS OF ASSISTANCE REMAINED LARGE, THEY WERE OF LESS CRITICAL IMPORTANCE THAN DURING THE POST-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD.

10. THREE SIGNIFICANT CHANGES CHARACTERIZE PRESENT FOREIGN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO ZAIRE. THE FIRST CHANGE IS THE INTRODUCTION OF HIGHLY PUBLICIZED CHINESE ASSISTANCE IN AGRICULTURE AND HEALTH. SIGNIFICANT CHINESE ASSISTANCE TO ZAIRE BEGAN IN 1975 FOLLOWING PRESIDENT MOBUTU'S VISIT TO CHINA IN LATE 1974. CHINESE ASSISTANCE APPEARS TO BE RELATED TO CHINESE POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND ITS IMPACT THUS FAR HAS BEEN TO CREATE A FAVORABLE IMPRESSION OF THE CHINESE AS HARDWORKING AND PRODUCTIVE PEOPLE. WHILE RECENT GOZ ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION MEASURES SEEMS TO INDICATE A REALIZATION THAT THE STATE-OWNED AGRICULTURE AND INDUSTRY CANNOT BE DIRECTLY TRANSPLANTED INTO ZAIRE, IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT AT LEAST SOME ASPECTS OF THE CHINESE MODEL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WILL BE VIEWED BY ZAIRIAN POLICY MAKERS AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO BE CONSIDERED IN ADDRESSING ZAIRE'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. A SECOND CHANGE IS THAT, GIVEN ZAIRE'S PRESENT BALANCE OF PAYMENTS CRUNCH, THE OBJECTIVE OF WESTERN ASSISTANCE IN SHIFTING FROM PROMOTION OF LONG-RUN ECONOMIC GROWTH TO SHORT-RUN SUPPORT OF ZAIRIAN IMPORTS. A SHARP FALL IN COPPER PRICES FROM AN AVERAGE OF \$0.92 PER POUND IN 1974 TO \$0.55 PER POUND IN 1975 HAS BEEN A PRIMARY CAUSE OF THIS BALANCE OF PAYMENTS CRISIS. THE THIRD IMPORTANT CHANGE IS THAT FOR THE TIME BEING FOREIGN ASSISTANCE WILL BE CRUCIAL IN FINANCING CONTINUED IMPORTS OF THE FOOD AND EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO KEEP THE ECONOMY

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GOING. ZAIRE'S RELIANCE ON FOREIGN ASSISTANCE WILL BE LESS SEVERE THAN DURING THE 1960-68 PERIOD BECAUSE

ZAIRE HAS MORE TRAINED NATIONALS AND DOMESTIC ORDER. ITS RELIANCE ON FORIENG HELP WILL, HOWEVER, BE GREATER THAN IT HAS BEEN DURING THE PAST SEVEN YEARS.

11. THIRD COUNTRY MILITARY AID TO ZAIRES: DATA ON THE MONETARY VALUE OF THIRD COUNTRY MILITARY PROGRAMS IN ZAIRES IS NOT AVAILABLE. BOTH CHINA AND NORTH KOREA HAVE PROVIDED MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ZAIRES IN 1975. FRANCE IS PROVIDING A LIMITED AMOUNT OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN CONNECTION WITH THE SALE OF 17 MIRAGE AIRCRAFT. THE TOTAL VALUE OF THE MIRAGE SALE, WHICH WAS FINANCED BY FRENCH GOVERNMENT CREDITS, IS ESTIMATED AT \$53 MILLION FOR THE AIRCRAFT AND \$46 MILLION FOR RELATED SUPPLIES. THE IMPACT OF THIRD COUNTRY MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ZAIRES IS EXPECTED TO BE MINIMAL. THE ITALIANS CLOSED THEIR MILITARY MISSION IN DECEMBER 1975 LEAVING ZAIRES WITHOUT AN IN-COUNTRY PILOT TRAINING CAPABILITY. FRENCH ASSISTANCE IS EXPECTED TO BE LIMITED TO SUPPORT OF THE MIRAGE PROGRAM. BELGIAN ASSISTANCE IS LIMITED TO GENERAL INSTRUCTION AND NO TANGIBLE AID OR CREDIT IS FORECAST FROM THIS SOURCE. THIS LEAVES THE U.S. AS VIRTUALLY THE ONLY COUNTRY THAT WILL HAVE ANY SIGNIFICANT IMPACT WITH REGARD TO MILITARY ASSISTANCE.

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